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RUNNABLE, RUINABLE REPO AND THE GREAT 
RECESSION: A PANIC-PROOFING APPROACH TO 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Aaron Metviner* 
We want a system that is not prone to panics, or, better yet, a system 
that does not have panics, a system where losing confidence does not 
happen . . . In the aftermath of the [2008 financial crisis], how can 
such a system be designed? 
—Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand (2010)  
INTRODUCTION 
“The [2008 financial] crisis,” then Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke reflected at a 2012 conference on financial regulation, “is best 
understood as a classic financial panic.”1 A “panic” occurs when short-term 
debt claimants decide en masse to no longer fund the banking system.2 Yale 
economist Gary Gorton has shown that “the most important part of the panic 
occurred in the repo market.”3 “Run on repos,” he holds, “[was] the core 
problem in the financial crisis.”4  
“Repo” is shorthand for “sale and repurchase agreement.” Institutional 
financiers—like money market mutual funds, pension funds, and corporate 
treasuries—enter into these short-term (typically overnight) “repo agreements” 
with Wall Street firms. Repo provides them with a sort of demand deposit 
 
 * Aaron Metviner received his JD/MBA in finance from Emory University, where he received the 
Dean’s Award in Banking Law. He will join the New York law firm Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP 
as a financial restructuring associate in 2018. He would like to thank professors James Elliott and Paul Zwier 
for their guidance on this paper.  
 1 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Comm’n, Remarks at the Russell Sage Foundation and the 
Century Foundation Conference on Rethinking Finance: Some Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy 
Response (April 13, 2012). 
 2 MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM 108 (2016) (“[A] panic is a situation in which ‘holders of 
short-term liabilities . . . [refuse] to fund banks.’”). 
 3 GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 133 (2010). Also Laurence 
Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers 7 (July 14, 2016) (paper prepared for meeting of the NBER Monetary 
Economics Program) (“The fatal part of this cycle was a liquidity crisis . . . the most important problem 
[involving] repurchase agreements, or repos.”). Id. at 111 (“The largest liquidity drain [on Wall Street banks in 
2007/2008] . . . was a loss of repo financing.”). 
 4 Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, Brookings Paper on 
Economic Activity, October 18, 2010, at 279.  
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account for their excess cash.5 It also gives Wall Street firms access to an 
enormous amount of cash. The “run on repo” was a run by major financial 
institutions (the repo lenders) on other major financial institutions (the repo 
borrowers).  
Demand deposit accounts and overnight repo agreements serve a similar 
function for retail depositors and repo “depositors” respectively. Large 
financial institutions, not unlike regular people, want to earn interest on their 
excess cash while not losing the ability to access their cash at any time. That is 
why they enter into these overnight repo agreements with Wall Street banks. 
Each day, they can either “withdraw” their cash or “roll over” their repo. If 
they choose the former, the repo borrower—under the terms of the repo 
agreement—must obviously honor that demand.  
The key practical difference between demand deposits and overnight repo 
“deposits” is that the federal government provides deposit insurance for the 
former but not the latter.6 To lessen the repo lenders’ counterparty default risk 
(i.e., that the Wall Street bank won’t have the cash on hand to honor the repo 
lender’s “withdrawal”), repo deposits are collateralized. Repo lenders are fully 
secured creditors of their counterparty banks, contractually armed with 
immediate recourse to the specified collateral under each repo agreement if 
their counterparty bank defaults. 
One of the key lessons to be drawn from the 2008 financial crisis is that 
this security interest was not enough of a security interest to offset the repo 
lenders’ counterparty default risk. In other words, having immediate recourse 
to collateral—even high-quality collateral—was inadequate to temper the 
concerns of skittish repo lenders and contain the contagious run on repo.7 
Vanderbilt law professor and former Treasury bureaucrat Morgan Ricks has 
made this point loud and clear, most recently in his 2016 book The Money 
Problem.  
Gary Gorton and Morgan Ricks are two of academia’s main proponents of 
the “panic-proofing” approach to financial regulation. That approach, on which 
 
 5 Id., at 276 (“Entities [such as institutional investors, pension funds, mutual funds, states and 
municipalities, and nonfinancial firms] . . . would like to have a safe investment that earns interest, while 
retaining flexibility to use the cash when needed—in short, a demand deposit-like product.”). 
 6 The FDIC backstops retail deposits at insured banks up to $250 thousand (prior to the financial crisis, 
$100 thousand).  
 7 See BEN BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT: A MEMOIR OF A CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH, at 397 
(discussing “the paralyzing uncertainty [on the part of repo lenders] about banks’ financial health in 2007 and 
2008).  
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this paper ideologically stands, is based on the following logical progression 
and understanding of US banking history:  
1 – US banking history was marked by frequent financial panics8 (and in 
turn macroeconomic tragedies) until the Depression-era advent of deposit 
insurance in 1934. Deposit insurance is to thank for the 75-year “Quiet 
Period”—of no systemic panics from the Depression to the Recession—in US 
banking history.9  
2 – A panic by institutional financiers, mainly overnight repo creditors on 
systemic financial institutions,10 commenced in August 2007.11 This panic 
reached its acute phase in September 2008, when twelve out of America’s 13 
leading financial institutions faced dire threats to their survival.12 If not for this 
panic, the Great Recession would have been far less severe and might not have 
happened.13  
3 – Systemically important financial institutions (the “SIFIs,” mostly Wall 
Street banks14) continue to rely heavily on runnable short-term debt to finance 
their long-term activities. Thus, “panics represent far and away the biggest 
threat that the financial system poses to the broader economy.”15 The focus of 
financial regulation should therefore be on “panic-proofing.”16  
 
 8 Id. at 108 (“Gorton uses “panic” the same way I use it here: a panic is a situation in which ‘holders of 
short-term liabilities . . . [refuse] to fund banks.’”). 
 9 See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 64 (“Periodic banking panics 
have been the norm in U.S. history. But the panics appeared to end in the U.S. when deposit insurance was 
legislated in 1934.”). 
 10 Id. at 54 and 58 (“The run occurred in the repo market . . . depositors” were firms that lent money in 
the repo market.”). See also GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE 
THEM COMING 190 (“The banking system on repo became very large prior to the crisis.”). 
 11 See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 23 (“The current crisis is a 
banking panic.”). 
 12 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT’L. COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. 
AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, 354 (January 2011). 
 13 See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, at 183 (“The deterioration of house prices and 
defaults in the subprime mortgage market were not enough to cause a systemic crisis by themselves.”). 
 14 See BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT, at 395 (“We focused on the nineteen largest U.S.-owned 
bank holding companies, those with assets of $100 billion or more. Collectively, they hold about two-thirds of 
the assets and half the loans in the U.S. banking system.”).  
 15 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 24.  
 16 Id. at 122 (“[There is a] strong case that panics should be viewed as the central problem for financial 
stability policy.”); Id. at 3 (“Panic-proofing, as opposed to, say, asset bubble prevention or “systemic risk” 
mitigation, should be the central objective of financial stability policy.”). See also GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE 
INVISIBLE HAND, at 183 (“We want a system that is not prone to panics, or, better yet, a system that does not 
have panics, a system where losing confidence does not happen . . . In the aftermath of the [Great Recession], 
how can such a system be designed?”). 
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Ricks and Gorton agree that the focus of financial regulation should be on 
panic-proofing. They have different ideas, however, on how policymakers 
should go about panic-proofing the financial system. Gorton would reform the 
repo market by ensuring the high quality of repo collateral. Ricks would 
federally insure all the short-term debt obligations of systemically important 
commercial banks. And both would limit the exposure levels of the SIFIs to 
runnable short-term debt.  
This paper argues for a sort of Gorton/Ricks hybrid approach to panic-
proofing, whereby the federal government (1) insures the very-short-term repo 
obligations of the SIFIs (while also ensuring the high-quality of the collateral 
under those repo agreements) and (2) limits the exposure levels of the SIFIs to 
all other forms of uninsured runnable debt.  
Section I will discuss the historical panic-proofing success of deposit 
insurance in the US. It will explain how deposit insurance became an 
anachronistic solution to forestalling panics, given the rise of the money 
markets and the institutional “depositor.” It will then cover the repo market, 
the run on repo of 2007 and 2008, and why repo lenders ran en masse from the 
SIFIs in the prelude to the Recession.  
Section II will examine the two main pieces of financial legislation to 
emerge from the Great Recession, the domestic law Dodd-Frank and the 
international accord Basel III. It will specifically ask what these laws do to 
contain panics by repo lenders, as well as discuss their general “risk-
constraint” (not panic-proofing) approach to financial regulation.  
Section III will expand upon the panic-proofing models for financial 
regulation as proposed by Ricks and Gorton. It will critique these models 
before offering this paper’s original panic-proofing approach.  
I. RUNNABLE, RUINABLE REPO AND THE GREAT RECESSION 
A. Banking’s Inherent Susceptibility to Panics  
The classic business model of banking involves a heavy reliance on short-
term debt to finance long-term assets.17 This almost has to be the case, since 
 
 17 See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 52 (“[B]anking inevitably involves [borrowing 
short to finance long assets] because part of making the “deposit” nearly riskless is for it to be short maturity. 
Note that with insured deposits, the debt is effectively long maturity because depositors have no need to run 
their banks to try to withdraw cash.”). 
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“part of making the “deposit” nearly riskless is for it to be short maturity.”18 
But this makes banks “inherently susceptible to a liquidity crisis or “run” in 
which short-term claimants simultaneously seek to redeem.”19  
Prior to the Depression-era establishment of deposit insurance in 1934, 
American banking was marked by regular panics and macroeconomic storms. 
Concerned their banks could fail, retail depositors rushed to withdraw their 
funds. Failure to withdraw in time could mean becoming an unsecured creditor 
of a failed bank in a bankruptcy proceeding—and perhaps having to wait years 
before receiving any money back.  
B. Establishment of the FDIC and the “Quiet Period” in US Banking 
The tragedy of the Great Depression, triggered by a widespread panic by 
retail depositors, prompted the US Congress to establish federal deposit 
insurance in 1934. A new federal agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), would now insure all bank deposits at insured member 
banks up to a certain dollar amount (today $250 thousand).  
Retail depositors could now rest assured that, if their bank were to fail, the 
FDIC would promptly send them a check covering the full amount of their 
deposit balance. They now had no reason to withdraw their funds from their 
banks in a frenzy anymore—their deposits were backed by the full faith and 
credit of the US Treasury.  
The advent of deposit insurance set the stage for the 75-year “Quiet 
Period” in American banking—a period marked by no systemic panics.20 
Deposit insurance “stopped the cycle of runs on demand deposits and allowed 
them to be used safely as money,”21 creating an “unusually stable time for the 
US economy.”22  
C. Rise of the Institutional “Depositor” and Unraveling of the Quiet Period  
The Quiet Period began to unravel in the 1980s. Wall Street firms, 
historically reliant on retail deposits for their cash needs, began to rely 
 
 18 Id.  
 19 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 4. See also Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers,” at 22 
(commenting on the nature of Wall Street banks’ short-term funding in the lead-up to the Crisis: “Some of this 
funding was unsecured commercial paper, but a much larger part was repurchase agreements, or ‘repos.’”). 
 20 See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 61 (“[T]here was no systemic event in banking 
[from the Great Depression] until 2007.”). 
 21 See Gorton & Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, at 268.  
 22 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 108.  
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increasingly on institutional money—that of money market funds, pension 
funds, and other large financial institutions. There had been an “explosion of 
the modern day money markets,”23 and these financiers needed a safe place to 
store their excess cash in the short-term.24 Repo provided that place. Retail 
deposits, in turn, diminished in importance as a financing vehicle for Wall 
Street firms.  
By 2007, a run by these institutional repo creditors would be capable of 
leading to large-scale liquidity problems on Wall Street. On Wall Street’s 
collective pre-Recession balance sheet, liabilities for repo debt far exceeded 
the banks’ readily available liquidity.25 And repo deposits were not FDIC-
insured (they well exceeded $250 thousand in value). Gorton states the obvious 
point: “Deposit insurance works well for retail investors but leaves a challenge 
for institutions with large cash holdings.”26 FDIC insurance no longer served a 
panic-proofing purpose.27 
Commencing in August 2007—and culminating in September 2008 
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers—an en masse run by repo creditors 
on their Wall Street counterparties brought the Quiet Period to a harsh close.  
D. Repo  
The “repo agreement”28 would overtime become an increasingly important 
vehicle of short-term debt financing for Wall Street firms. By the time of the 
Crisis, repo had become “the most important form of short-term finance in 
modern financial markets.”29 Gorton estimates the size of the “important” and 
“immense” repo market to have been “somewhere around $10 trillion” in 
2008, roughly the same size as the total assets of the entire regulated U.S. 
 
 23 See Ricks, “Reforming the Short-Term Funding Markets,” at 20.  
 24 See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 55.  
 25 See Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers,” at 81, describing how the amount of collateral pledged in 
repo agreements greatly exceeded Wall Street banks’ liquidity pools. Using Lehman as an example: 
“[Lehman’s] liquidity pool could absorb some loss of repo funding, but not too much.”  
 26 See Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System BROOKINGS PAPERS 
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 261, 263 (Fall 2010).  
 27 See Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, 
Transition Risks, and Lessons for India 31 (New York Univ. Stern Schl. of Business, Working Paper 2011): 
“In the crisis of 2007–2009, when we faced wholesale depositor runs, the Federal Reserve had to pull out all 
stops—given the lack of FDIC coverage of such deposits—to effectively suspend the runs” (emphasis added).  
 28 “Repo agreement” is short for “sale and repurchase agreement.”  
 29 See MILNE, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF CREDIT, at 32. See also Hordahl and King, at 39: “The 
(former) top US investment banks funded roughly half of their assets using repo markets, with additional 
exposure due to off-balance sheet financing of their customers.” 
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banking sector at the time.30 Plus, the repo market had doubled in size between 
2002 and 2007.31  
How does a repo “deposit” work? The repo depositor sends the repo 
borrower (the Wall Street bank) its cash on three conditions: (1) the deposit 
will be secured by collateral (i.e., securities valued at above the amount of the 
cash deposit)32; (2) the bank will “repurchase” (“repo”) the collateral on a 
specified future date, usually the next day, at the agreed-upon price33 (the 
difference between the repurchase price and the cash deposit is the “repo rate,” 
or the interest that accrues to the lender34); and (3) if the bank defaults on its 
obligation to repurchase the collateral, the repo lender will have automatic 
recourse to the collateral, which it can immediately liquidate.35  
If the repo agreement is an overnight transaction (as usually is the case), 
then the repo depositor has a choice each day: either “roll over” its repo (i.e., 
not withdraw and collect another day’s worth of interest) or not roll over its 
repo (i.e., withdraw its funds from the bank). If the repo lender chooses to not 
roll over its repo, the bank has two options: either repurchase the collateral (as 
it is contractually obliged to do under the repo agreement) or, if lacking the 
liquidity to repurchase the securities, walk away from the deal and leave the 
collateral with the repo lender.36  
The question becomes: is automatic recourse to the collateral enough of a 
security interest to forestall bank runs by skittish repo lenders? Given the 
 
 30 See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 43–44.  
 31 See Gorton and Metrick, “Regulating the Shadow Banking System,” at 278, referring to data 
compiled by BIS economists Peter Hordahl and Michael King.  
 32 See Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers,” at 22: “The cash advanced in a repo is less than the value 
of the collateral. The purpose of this over-collateralization, or “haircut,” is to protect the cash lender if the 
borrower defaults and the lender must liquidate the collateral . . . typical haircuts . . . ranged from about 1% for 
Treasury securities to 12% for high-yield convertible bonds.”  
 33 See Gorton and Metrick, “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo,” at 9.  
 34 See Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers, at 23: “Because repos are safe for cash lenders, the interest 
rates are low. During the Summer of 2008, overnight repo rates were close to the target federal funds rate of 
2%.”  
 35 Repurchase agreements are exempt from the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code. If a party to a 
repo agreement files for bankruptcy, the non-defaulting party can unilaterally enforce the termination 
provisions of the repo agreement, rather than having to become a debtor in the defaulting party’s bankruptcy 
case. See American Home Mortgage Corp. v. Lehman Brothers (2008), upholding the automatic stay safe 
harbor for repurchase agreements. See also Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers,” at 23: “If a cash barrower 
defaults on a repo, the lender can liquidate the collateral immediately.” See also Gorton and Metrick, 
“Regulating the Shadow Banking System,” at 284, pointing out that “This safe harbor has real value to market 
participants.”  
 36 See Paolo Saguato, The liquidity dilemma and the repo market: A two-step policy option to address 
the regulatory void 5 (London Schl. Of Econ. Law, Society, and Econ. Woring Paper 21, 2015).  
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panicky behavior of repo lenders in the lead-up to the Great Recession, the 
answer seems to be no.  
E. The Run on Repo  
In the summer of 2007, US housing prices began to slow at the same time 
subprime mortgage defaults began to pick up in pace. Wall Street banks, on the 
asset sides of their balance sheets, were heavily exposed to these ailing 
markets. Repo creditors became anxious about the fundamental health of their 
repo borrower counterparties. As Gorton recounts,  
When news of [the housing and mortgage] shock arrived, bank 
creditors went to monitor the banks: Did they have the money? The 
run was a demand for cash, and repo agreements were not renewed    
. . . To meet cash demands37, [banks] had to sell assets, causing the 
prices of all assets to go down…they became hard to sell to raise 
sufficient cash, so the Federal Reserve stepped in to buy assets. The 
crisis was magnified when Lehman Brothers was not bailed out. In 
the end, a number of major financial firms disappeared: Bear Stearns, 
Merrill Lynch, Wachovia, Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, 
and Countrywide. The economy became moribund.38  
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke reported that, in the acute phase 
of the financial crisis, of the thirteen “most important financial institutions in 
the United States, twelve were at risk of failure within a period of a week or 
two.”39 The Great Recession was a systemic event, and it is important to 
realize that it began with a financial panic—a run on short-term money market 
instruments, predominantly overnight repo. The developments in the US 
housing and mortgage markets were not the main culprit.40 In Bernanke’s 
view, these developments were mere “triggering events that interacted with 
deeper vulnerabilities in the financial system.”41 In line with Gorton and Ricks, 
 
 37 See Viral V. Acharya and T. Sabri Oncu, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act and a Little Known Corner of Wall Street: the Repo Market (New York Univ. Stern Schl. of 
Business, Regulating Wall St) w4.stern.nyu.edu/blogs/regulatingwallstreet/2010/97/the-doddfrank-wall-street-
reo.html: “With the Lehman bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the repo market . . . came to a near halt and 
settlement fails of [banks] skyrocketed.”  
 38 See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, at 182–83.  
 39 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION at 354 (Jan. 2011)  
 40 See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 47. “Subprime mortgage originations in 2005 and 
2006 totaled about $1.2 trillion, a large number to be sure, but not large enough to cause a systemic crisis.” 
And at 115: “House price declines and foreclosures do not explain the panic.” See also GORTON, 
MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, at 186: “The subprime shock was not large enough to account for the 
crisis.”  
 41 See Ben S. Bernanke, “Some Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response,” remarks at the 
Russell Sage Foundation and the Century Foundation Conference on Rethinking Finance, New York, April 13, 
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Bernanke believes “the Crisis [to be] best understood as a classic financial 
panic.”42 And “run on repos,” Gorton clarifies, “[was] the core problem.”43  
Consider for example the “sudden loss of repo financing”44 and ensuing 
collapse of the fifth-largest US investment bank, Bear Stearns. In March 2008,  
Bear’s balance sheet had an asset side exposed to the housing market 
and a liability side that was extremely fragile and exposed to runs. In 
particular, Bear was rolling over each night in excess of $75 billion 
of repo contracts on mortgage-backed securities . . . Bear’s primary 
money market financiers…refused to roll over their repos. Bear had 
to draw down on its $20 billion pool of liquidity, and within a week, 
was brought to its knees . . . Bear faced bankruptcy by the middle of 
March.45  
In September, the same series of events plagued the fourth-largest 
investment bank, Lehman Brothers. In his paper “The Fed and Lehman 
Brothers,” Johns Hopkins economist Laurence Ball details how “fears about 
Lehman grew over the summer of 2008 as the firm suffered losses on its real 
estate investments. Eventually Lehman experienced a run…a liquidity 
crisis…[and] the most important problem involved Lehman’s repurchase 
agreements.”46  
Once Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the repo panic fully engulfed Wall 
Street. What followed was a “severe financing crunch” for consumers and 
 
2012 www.russellsage.org/rethinking-finance. See also GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 47: 
“The shock was combined with asymmetric information about the locations and sizes of exposures to subprime 
. . . it was not clear which firms had the largest exposures . . . the “depositors” were firms that deposited 
money in the form of repo and received a bond as collateral . . . depositors did not know which banks were 
more likely to fail . . . they just knew they were exposed to the risk that their bank would be insolvent. So they 
“ran” . . . The run occurred in the repo market.”  
 42 See Gorton, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 47: “The run on repo is . . . akin to previous 
panics.” And at 58: “A banking panic is a systemic event because the banking system cannot honor 
commitments and is insolvent. Banks . . . decided to sell assets . . . Asset prices plummeted. The banking 
system became insolvent.”  
 43 See Gorton and Metrick, “Regulating the Shadow Banking System,” at 279.  
 44 See Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers,” at 25.  
 45 See Acharya, “The Dodd Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, Transition 
Risks, and Lessons for India,” at 29. See also Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers,” at 7: “Losses of repos 
were disastrous for Bear’s and Lehman’s liquidity . . . On Friday September 12, Lehman had almost no cash, 
and it was clear the firm would immediately default on obligations if it opened for business on Monday 
September 15.” 
 46 See Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers at 7; Id. at 103 (“Most of Lehman’s cash needs starting on 
September 15 reflected repo agreements that were not going to roll: according to my estimates, lost repos 
account for $66 billion out of a projected cash shortfall of $88 billion.” Also at 109: “Lost repos account for 
75% of [Lehman’s] borrowing needs ($66 billion out of $88 billion).”).  
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businesses in the United States.47 Costs of financing skyrocketed while the 
supply of available financing collapsed. Since overall economic activity is 
heavily reliant on outside financing, the economic output of the United States 
plummeted. Millions of Americans lost their jobs. The short-term debt panic, 
concludes Ricks, was the “proximate cause of the severe recession,” the panic-
induced financing crunch the “major driver.”48  
Ricks’ takeaway point—as is Gorton’s—is that “panics should be viewed 
as the central problem for financial stability policy.”49 
F. Why did Repo Lenders Run? 
If panics are “the problem” and forestalling them “the goal,” then 
understanding why they occur in the first place is the necessary first analytical 
step towards devising a panic-proofing solution.50  
Specifically, why did repo lenders—the all-important panickers of 2008—
refuse to roll over their repos? Remember that repos are fully secured loans. 
Repo lenders have instant recourse to the collateral if their counterparty bank 
defaults (even if the bank files for bankruptcy51). Given the highly secured 
nature of repo, “[Wall Street] firms theoretically should never lose repo 
funding, because lenders [should] not fear losses from default.”52 Why then did 
repo lenders run? Ricks and Gorton offer fundamentally different explanations 
for this.  
Gorton believes that repo lenders panicked due to concerns over the value 
of the collateral under their repo agreements. Since “repos are essentially 
secured loans, counterparty risk [was] not an issue.”53 Rather, it was 
“uncertainty about the value of the collateral, should the counterparty fail,” 
which led repo lenders to not roll over their repos.54  
Ricks, on the other hand, believes that repo lenders panicked not due to 
collateral-value concerns but counterparty-viability concerns. He contends that 
 
 47 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 121.  
 48 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM at 111, 121. 
 49 Id., at 122.  
 50 See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 61 (“What should be the new regulations? The 
answer to that question depends on what the problem is that resulted in a panic.”).  
 51 See 11 U.S. Code § 559.  
 52 See Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers at 23.  
 53 See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 133.  
 54 Id., at 54, 114 (“Confidence in the information insensitivity of repo collateral has been called into 
question.”).  
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“repo creditors do care about whether the [bank] will default” (whereas to 
Gorton, that’s “not an issue”). It is worth quoting Ricks at some length here, 
since this point is foundational to the panic-proofing proposal I make at the end 
of the paper.  
It is sometimes argued that secured money-claimants decline to 
do fundamental analysis on their counterparties only because they 
look to the collateral, not the counterparty, for protection.55 This 
view is mistaken.  
This is a crucial point: secured money-claimants are not 
indifferent between holding the money-claim and holding the 
underlying collateral. They chose to hold the money-claim (instead 
of an asset like the collateral) precisely because of its monetary 
attributes; they chose to sacrifice yield for moneyness.  
Even if the collateral can be seized immediately upon default,56 
the collateral lacks the moneyness property that was the very reason 
for holding a money-claim in the first place. Repo creditors don’t 
want the collateral. It’s all downside—collateral value in excess of 
the repo face amount must be returned to the defaulting borrower—
and besides, it’s an operational hassle. Accordingly, repo creditors 
and other secured money claimants do care about whether the [bank] 
will default.57  
A 2010 investigatory report by a task force of repo market participants 
corroborates Ricks’ point: “Repo depositors focus primarily, if not almost 
exclusively, on counterparty concerns...even in the presence of high-quality 
collateral.”58 The Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission Report similarly found 
that repo lenders in the Crisis were “reluctant to risk the hassle of seizing [and 
liquidating] collateral, even good collateral, from a bankrupt borrower.”59  
In short, repo creditors just “don’t want the collateral. It’s all downside,”60 
irrespective of the collateral’s quality.   
 
 55 See Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers at 23 (“A firm theoretically should never lose repo funding, 
because lenders do not fear losses from default”).  
 56 Repo creditors are exempt from the automatic stay in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 559–560.  
 57 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM at 213–14. 
 58 Task Force on Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Payments Risk Committee, Report, 19 (May 17, 2010), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/microsites/prc/files/report_100517.pdf. 
 59 See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the 
National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, 293 (Jan. 
2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. An executive of State Street Bank was 
quoted in that report as saying, “We don’t want to go through that uncomfortable process of having to liquidate 
collateral.” 
 60 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM at 214.  
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G. Looking Forward: What is the Lesson from the Run on Repo?  
If recourse to repo collateral is “all downside,” then clearly repo as a 
“secured” form of lending is not sufficiently secured to forestall panics by risk-
averse repo lenders. Repo lenders need a heightened sense of security to “stick 
it out” (i.e., to roll over their repos) when faced with counterparty-viability 
concerns. How can we provide them with this increased sense of security? 
More broadly, how can we panic-proof the financial system?  
It is a critical question because a future panic remains a real possibility. In 
2016, the Volcker Alliance, a financial policy think-tank chaired by former Fed 
Chairman Paul Volcker and comprised of some of the world’s leading financial 
minds, published an important pamphlet entitled “Unfinished Business: 
Banking in the Shadows.”61 Its main point is that an excessive reliance by Wall 
Street banks on short-term debt (including a substantial amount of runnable 
repo debt) remains the key unsolved problem for financial regulation today.62 
“Trillions of dollars of short-term debt,” they caution, “continue to roll over 
regularly63 . . . Despite the recent reforms, the financial system will remain 
prone to funding runs.”64  
Former New York Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo has similarly warned that 
“the levels of runnable funding . . . are [not] at safe or optimal levels, and the 
conditions for destructive runs that threaten financial stability [still] exist.”65 
And Ben Bernanke himself has cautioned that “The risk of short-term funding 
runs has not been eliminated.”66  
Evidently, the post-Crisis reforms did not panic-proof the financial system. 
The two main pieces of financial reform legislation to emerge from the Great 
Recession were the domestic law Dodd-Frank and the international accord 
 
 61 See Generally Unfinished Business: Banking in the Shadows, THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE (2016), 
https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/VolckerAlliance_UnfinishedBusinessBankingI
nTheShadows.pdf. 
 62 “Put simply, uninsured short-term funding remains a threat to financial stability.” Unfinished 
Business: Banking in the Shadows, THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE 21 (2016), https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/ 
default/files/attachments/VolckerAlliance_UnfinishedBusinessBankingInTheShadows.pdf.  
 63 See BALKANOVA ET AL., REFERENCE GUIDE TO U.S. REPO AND SECURITIES LENDING MARKETS, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports NO. 740, at 13 (2015) (estimating in December 2015 that 
“U.S. repo activity is split at $1.84 trillion in triparty and $1.58 trillion for bilateral repo”).  
 64 See THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE at 21.  
 65 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Opening Remarks at the 
Center for American Progress and Americans for Financial Reform Conference (July 2016), at 3–4, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20160712a.pdf.  
 66 See BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT, at 574.  
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Basel III, both passed in 2010. In the next section, I will analyze this 
legislation with a panic-proofing comb.  
II. THE POST-CRISIS FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORMS: DODD-FRANK AND 
BASEL III 
A. The Risk-Constraint Approach to Financial Regulation  
The post-Crisis banking regulatory framework follows a “risk constraint” 
rather than “panic-proofing” approach to financial regulation.67 To understand 
the “risk constraint” approach, consider what then President Barack Obama 
said in his major “Speech on Financial Reform” in 2009—in the heart of the 
Recession: “The only way to avoid [another] crisis of this magnitude is to 
ensure that [Wall Street firms] can’t take risks that threaten our entire financial 
system, and [that] they have the resources to weather even the worst of 
economic storms.”68  
To fend off another Great Recession, in Obama’s view, would mean 
mandating “safer” balance sheets at the SIFIs. But this risk-constraint 
approach, Ricks laments, is an “indirect strategy,”69 a deliberate policy choice 
to “leave run-prone funding structures intact while taking aim at the sorts of 
things that trigger panics…various excesses that are supposedly endemic to 
finance—excessive leverage, excessive risk taking, “overheating” markets, and 
other “systemic” risks.”  
And the risk-constraint approach can lead to misguided policy. Take for 
example Basel II’s balance sheet treatment of AAA-rated insured mortgage-
backed securities in the lead-up to the Great Recession.70 Under the Basel II 
core capital requirement of capital to risk-weighted assets ratio of 8%, the top 
20 US banks—heavily exposed to these securities—appeared exceedingly 
“safe” in 2007 and 2008, averaging a ratio of 11.7%.71  
Because of their AAA ratings, these securities had a significantly 
lower capital requirement under the Basel II arrangement . . . Credit 
protection in the form of credit default swaps (CDS) purchased from 
AAA-rated insurers on AAA-rated securities led to a 0% capital 
 
 67 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 248.  
 68 See Barack Obama, “Speech on Financial Reform,” September 14, 2009.  
 69 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 249–50.  
 70 Basel II is the second of the international Basel accords, passed in 2004.  
 71 See Acharya, “The Dodd Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, Transition 
Risks, and Lessons for India,” at 18.  
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weight on these securities in the portfolio of banks’ balance sheets . . 
. No wonder [Wall Street banks] loaded up on these asset-backed 
securities . . . [their] balance sheets doubled from 2004 to 2007 with 
only a minor increase in Basel-implied risk.72 
Under the risk-constraint approach, policymakers and financial regulators must 
make judgment calls when predefining “risk” on a bank’s balance sheet. As 
human beings, they will make mistakes. That they considered CDS-backed 
AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities “safe” in the lead-up to the Recession 
should give us pause.  
In sum, Dodd-Frank and Basel III are “risk-constraining” measures, 
imposing heightened capital, leverage, and liquidity constraints—as well as 
regular “stress tests”—on Wall Street firms in an effort to make them more 
resilient in “even the worst of economic storms.” These are welcome changes, 
but they “leave run-prone funding structures intact.”73  
B. The Post-Crisis Framework’s Treatment of the Runnable Repo Problem  
Despite the run on repo playing a central role in precipitating the Great 
Recession, Dodd-Frank and Basel III are “completely silent on how to reform 
the repo market.”74 In the 848 pages of Dodd-Frank, the phrase “repurchase 
agreement” appears just 37 times (including 25 times in the “Definitions” 
section). NYU economist Viral Acharya warns that “if [the repo] market is not 
reformed, runs on repo will occur in the future, potentially leading to systemic 
crises.”  
1. Dodd-Frank §§ 210 and 1105: Maintaining Repo Depositors’ 
Propensity to Withdraw 
There are two sections of Dodd-Frank that tangentially concern anxious 
repo lenders: § 210 creating the Orderly Liquidation Authority and § 1105 
discussing the possibility of government guarantee programs in future financial 
crises.75  
 
 72 Id.  
 73 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 249–50.  
 74 See Acharya and Sabri Oncu, “The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
and a Little Known Corner of Wall Street: the Repo Market.” See also SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: 
UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES, at 96 (“Lawmakers left an 
important source of risk essentially untouched: banks’ reliance on very short-term repo financing.”).  
 75 There is also § 610, which modifies the existing lending limits law to include “repurchase 
agreements” as a type of “loan and extension of credit . . . to a person outstanding at one time . . . [which] shall 
not exceed 10 per centum of the unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus of the association.”  
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In § 210, Dodd-Frank creates a receivership program for insolvent banks 
called the “Orderly Liquidation Authority” (OLA). If OLA is activated,76 the 
FDIC, as receiver of the failed bank, “may disaffirm or repudiate any 
contract”—including any repurchase agreement—it deems to be 
“burdensome.”77  
If the FDIC finds a repo agreement to not be “burdensome,” then it may 
honor the repo agreement (i.e., repurchase the collateral from the repo lender 
pursuant to the repo agreement). But to do so, it would first have to pass two 
high hurdles: (1) raise enough funds from the Treasury Department, despite 
strict borrowing limits,78 and (2) get explicit permission to honor the repo 
agreement under the “terms and conditions the [Treasury] Secretary may 
require.”79 The FDIC has said that it would be “highly unlikely” for it to ever 
honor a failed bank’s repo obligations in an OLA scenario.80 Adding this all 
up, the incentive of repo lenders to withdraw from their Wall Street 
counterparties in times of uncertainty remains intact.  
Turning to § 1105 on guarantee programs in future financial crises, Dodd-
Frank makes it possible for the FDIC to create “a widely available program to 
guarantee obligations of solvent [banks and bank holding companies] during 
times of severe economic distress.”81 The creation of such a program would 
 
 76 See Dodd-Frank § 203; See also RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 257, explaining the “extraordinary 
procedural hurdle” of activating OLA in the first place: “Bankruptcy is the default option, and activating OLA 
requires the approval of not only the supermajorities of the boards of the FDIC and the Fed but also the 
Treasury secretary in consultation with the president.”  
 77 See Dodd-Frank § 210(C)(1) 
 78 See Dodd-Frank § 210(n)(6). For the first 30 days of the FDIC’s receivership, the FDIC would be 
unlikely to be able to borrow from the Treasury more than 10% of the bank’s most recently reported total 
assets. See also § 210(n)(5), which requires congressional approval for the Treasury to issue Treasury 
securities in order to raise OLA proceeds if issuing such securities would exceed the statutory debt ceiling. 
 79 See Dodd-Frank § 210(n)(5) 
 80 FDIC, Interim Final Rule, “Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,” Federal Register 76, no. 16 (January 25, 2011), at 4212, the FDIC 
writing, “A major driver of the financial crisis and the panic experienced by the market in 2008 was in part due 
to an overreliance by many market participants on funding through short-term, secured transactions in the 
repurchase market . . . In applying its powers under the Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC must exercise care in 
valuing such collateral and will review the transaction to ensure it is not under-collateralized . . . if the creditor 
is under-secured due to a decline in the value of such collateral, the unsecured portion of the claim will be paid 
as a general creditor claim” and also that “most importantly, under no circumstances in a Dodd-Frank 
liquidation will taxpayers ever be exposed to loss.”  
 81 See Dodd-Frank § 1105(c)(1). The Treasury Secretary “may request” that the FDIC and Federal 
Reserve “determine whether a liquidity event exists that warrants use of the guarantee program” for solvent 
institutions (1104(a)(1)). Dodd-Frank includes as a “liquidity event” “an exceptional and broad reduction in 
the general ability of financial market participants . . . to borrow using financial assets as collateral without an 
unusual and significant increase in margin” (1105(g)(3)). If the FDIC and Fed determine a “liquidity event” 
exists, then the FDIC “shall create a widely available program to guarantee obligations of solvent insured 
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require a joint resolution of Congress.82 “Absent such approval, the [FDIC] 
shall issue no such guarantees.”83 Here again, the propensity of repo lenders to 
withdraw from the banking system at the first sign of counterparty distress 
remains intact, since to “rely on a mid-crisis act of Congress [to empower the 
FDIC to honor repo obligations]…would seem to be a strategy fraught with 
peril.”84 
In sum, we should take seriously Acharya’s warning that “runs on repo will 
happen in the future.” Dodd-Frank does not take the requisite steps to prevent 
them.  
2. Basel III’s Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Commendable but not Panic-
Proofing  
Perhaps the most important post-Crisis change in US financial regulation 
has been the adoption of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio of Basel III (the 
“LCR”).85 Under the LCR, the SIFIs must now hold enough “high quality 
liquid assets” to meet 100% of net cash outflows in a hypothetical 30-day 
“high-stress scenario.”86 In promulgating the LCR, the OCC defined “net cash 
 
depository institutions or solvent depository institution holding companies during times of severe economic 
distress.” (1105(a)). The FDIC, “with the concurrence of the [Treasury] Secretary,” shall establish the “terms 
and conditions” of such guaranty program (1105(b)(2)). “The Secretary (in consultation with the President) 
shall determine the maximum amount . . . that the [FDIC] may guarantee.” The President then “may transmit 
to Congress a written report of the plan,” and “absent [joint congressional] approval, the [FDIC] shall issue no 
such guarantees” (1105(c)(2)). 
 82 Id.  
 83 Id.  
 84 See Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 75, 135 
(2011). 
 85 Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 61,140 (October 10, 
2014). The US rule is based on the new Basel liquidity standards. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS (2013). 
See also U.S. TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES, 52 (2017), 
confirming the Trump administration’s support for the LCR (but only for America’s global systemically 
important financial institutions; “the [LCR] should be limited in application to only the largest banks”).  
 86 Basel III also established the Net Stable Funding Ratio (“NSFR”) requiring systemically important 
banks to increase the amount of their “stable funding” (short-term debt not being considered “stable). The US 
has not yet adopted this ratio and it appears unlikely that it will, at least in the Trump administration. In June 
2017, U.S. Treasury Secretary Stephen Mnuchin recommended delaying the implementation of the NSFR in 
the U.S.; See also U.S. TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES 13 
(2017), “Treasury recommends delaying the domestic implementation of the Net Stable Funding Ratio . . . [it] 
represents additional regulatory burden and would introduce potentially unnecessary capital and liquidity 
requirements on top of existing capital and liquidity requirements.”  
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outflows” as “reflecting aspects of historical stress events including…a partial 
loss of secured, short-term financing.”87  
While the LCR is a commendable initiative, it is not a panic-proofing 
solution.88 It assumes that financial regulators can correctly specify in advance 
the types of assets that can be easily liquidated in a panic. In a severe panic, no 
assets (other than perhaps the highest-quality sovereign securities) are 
guaranteed to sell at little or no discount.89  
Additionally, since the LCR treats certain illiquid securities and 
systemically risky funding better than others for purposes of calculating the 
ratio, it could “push banks towards regulatory arbitrage of the liquidity 
weights” (thereby fostering excessive concentration into those better-treated 
activities).90 Do not forget Wall Street’s “safe” pre-Recession balance sheets, 
loaded with “safe” CDS-backed AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities.91 The 
LCR could lead history into repeating itself.92  
 
 87 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve Board, and Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 19 (2014) (Overview of the 
Final Rule). 
 88 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 251; See also Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd Frank Act and Basel 
III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, Transition Risks, and Lessons for India 15 (International Growth 
Centre, Working Paper, 2011), https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Acharya-2011-Working-
Paper.pdf, “The introduction of the LCR . . . has merit.” See also Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd Frank Act and 
Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, Transition Risks, and Lessons for India 22 (International 
Growth Centre, Working Paper, 2011), “That liquidity risk is now at the forefront of Basel III . . . is clearly a 
step forward.”  
 89 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 251. “How confident should we be in [the] capacity [of 
regulators] . . . to specify in advance what sorts of assets can be easily liquidated in a panic?” See also Viral V. 
Acharya, The Dodd Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, Transition Risks, and 
Lessons for India 22 (International Growth Centre, Working Paper, 2011), surmising that government bonds, 
“which would traditionally have been liquid and safe” could become “significantly credit-risky,” and asking 
whether the “[Basel III] risk weights on government bonds are suitably calibrated.”  
 90 See Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, 
Transition Risks, and Lessons for India 22 (International Growth Centre, Working Paper, 2011), “Without a 
doubt, the implementation of the liquidity ratios will push banks towards regulatory arbitrage of the liquidity 
weights, in particular, to the best-treated illiquid securities and systemically risky funding. Of course, the 
unintended consequence will be a concentration into these activities. Regulators should be acutely aware of 
this problem and be prepared ex ante to adapt in an expedited way.”  
 91 Id. at 28.  
 92 Id. at 36, warning about a “sudden eruption of sovereign credit risk” given the LCR’s push for firms 
to hold more sovereign credit. The LCR “could constitute a significant systemic risk for the global economy in 
the future.” 
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III. PANIC-PROOFING APPROACHES TO FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Hundreds of scholars have studied the Great Recession, yet Gary Gorton 
and Morgan Ricks stand out for promulgating the “panic-proofing” approach 
to financial regulation. Gorton and Ricks argue that panics are what cause 
severe recessions and should thus be at the forefront of financial regulatory 
focus. They accordingly bemoan America’s “risk-constraint” approach to 
financial regulation, since it is an indirect approach that fails to pointedly 
address the runnable short-term debt problem. They credit the Depression-era 
advent of FDIC insurance for eliminating the recurrence of retail panics, and 
implore policymakers to devise a panic-proofing scheme to forestall 
institutional panics.  
How can policymakers go about panic-proofing the financial system, one 
that so heavily relies on short-term institutional money? Recall that a “panic” 
is when short-term debt claimants decide en masse to no longer fund the 
banking system.  
Former Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo has alluded to a whole “menu of 
possible responses” to the issue of runnable short-term debt at SIFIs.93 One 
extreme idea, for example, would be to simply restrict Wall Street banks from 
relying on short-term debt at all.94 That would solve the panic problem, since 
there would be no potential panickers left. But, as Gorton importantly points 
out, if “we want to provide a safe, deposit-like account for the bulk of repo 
depositors”95—who, as we know, “sacrifice yield for moneyness”96—then we 
need to instead “seek to preserve [this system] while making it much less 
vulnerable to a run.”97  
 
 93 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS PAPERS 
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 261, 310 (2010) (cmt. by Daniel Tarullo). 
 94 See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, at 197 (discussing the possibility of 
“squelching” systemically important banks from being able to finance themselves short). See also Daniel 
Tarullo, Remarks at the Center for American Progress and Americans for Financial Reform Conference: 
Exploring Shadow Banking: Can the Nation Avoid the Next Crisis? 5 (July 12, 2016), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20160712a.pdf, discussing “outright prohibition” as 
a possibility of a solution to the runnable short-term funding problem.  
 95 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS PAPERS 
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 261, 287 (2010).  
 96 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM at 213–14. 
 97 See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, at 197.  
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A. The Gorton Plan: A Focus on High-Quality Repo Collateral 
Gorton’s panic-proofing approach, unsurprisingly, is to “regulate repo.”98 
First, he would limit how much repo a systemically important nonbank (i.e., an 
investment bank or other financial institution) could engage in.99 Commercial 
banks, able to access the discount window of the Federal Reserve for desperate 
cash, would not be so limited in their repo exposure. Second, Gorton would 
focus on strengthening the quality of the “the backing collateral” involved in 
repo agreements.  
This second point—on repo collateral quality—is the cornerstone of 
Gorton’s panic-proofing proposal. Gorton’s system would be “aimed at 
creating a sufficient amount of high-quality collateral that [could] be used 
safely in repo transactions.”100 Gorton would “place the government in an 
oversight role in the securitization and repo markets [to] ensure that the safety 
of the collateral for repo be overseen.”101  
Gorton’s baseline panic-proofing assumption is that, if repo collateral is 
always of high quality (“namely ABS, treasuries, or agency bonds”102), then 
repo lenders will not run from their stressed Wall Street counterparties.103 
“Collateral for repo,” Gorton emphasizes, “must have [the] property [of] . . . 
demand deposits and AAA securities. What is needed [by repo lenders] is only 
the general knowledge that [their] collateral is high grade.”104  
Ricks sharply disagrees with Gorton on this point, arguing that high-quality 
collateral alone should not be expected to forestall repo runs: “Even if the 
collateral is of the highest quality and can be seized immediately on default, 
the collateral lacks the moneyness property that was the very reason for 
holding the money-claim in the first place. Accordingly, receiving the 
 
 98 Id. at 198.  
 99 See supra note 27, “Repos outside of banks would be constrained . . . .[they] could be offered by any 
institution with a license and would be regulated so as to be more expensive than [repos offered by commercial 
banks].”  
 100 Id. at 289.  
 101 See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, at 197–98. “The overarching goals of the 
proposal are to bring securitization under the regulatory umbrella and to provide a system of collateral 
production that can back repo without being so vulnerable to runs.” See also supra note 27, “Eligible collateral 
for banks would be any bond that the regulators approve for their portfolios.”  
 102 Id., at 198.  
 103 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 85: “Gorton’s preferred policy solution involves strict 
regulation of portfolio quality.” See also Gorton and Metrick, “Regulating the Shadow Banking System,” at 
280, discussing the “imperfectly collateralized” repo that was at the heart of the financial crisis.  
 104 See GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, at 181. See also RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 
85, describing Gorton’s proposed repo policy as being “a “strict regulation of portfolio quality.” 
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collateral is a distinctly unwelcome outcome for money-claimants.”105 Ricks 
does not even rule out a “run on fully secured Treasury repo.”106  
B. The Ricks Plan: Backstopping the Short-Term Debt of Systemic 
Commercial Banks  
Whereas Gorton would increase the federal government’s oversight and 
standards for repo collateral quality,107 Ricks would establish a federal 
insurance program to backstop the short-term debt obligations of systemically 
important commercial banks.108 The Ricks proposal contains five main pillars.  
First, only “licensed” SIFIs—the “member banks” in Ricks’ “licensed 
money system”109—would be permitted to access the short-term debt markets 
at all. To receive a license and thereby earn the privilege of borrowing short, 
banks would have to first meet a certain government-established “criteria of 
admission.”110 Market-making investment banks and commercial paper 
conduits would be strictly ineligible for licenses and precluded from accessing 
the short-term debt markets.111  
Second, the licensed SIFIs would be federally capped in terms of how 
much short-term debt they could engage in.112 There would be a “cap and trade 
system,” with each member bank holding a permit entitling it to engage in a 
certain nominal amount of short-term debt.113 A “monetary authority” would 
 
 105 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 89.  
 106 Id., at 214.  
 107 See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, at 197, where Gorton concedes about deposit 
insurance, “Let’s face it, the beneficial consequences of [deposit insurance] were probably the outcome of 
luck.”  
 108 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 17.  
 109 See Ricks, “Reforming the Short-Term Funding Markets,” at 12–18, introducing his plan for a 
“licensed money system.” At 13: “Licenses would be granted [by regulators] on an entity-by-entity basis.” 
And at 17: “Only the licensed entities would be allowed to fund short.” 
 110 See Ricks, “Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis,” at 143.  
 111 See Ricks, “Reforming the Short-Term Funding Markets,” at 16: “Unlicensed entities would be 
required to finance themselves in the long-term (capital) markets, not the short-term funding markets.” See 
also RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 17: “Entities other than member banks are prohibited from issuing 
money claims . . . .This prohibition might initially seem radical . . . and would have major consequences for 
the financial system as it exists today.” 
 112 See RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, at 228.  
 113 Id., at 21. “The system’s aggregate permit capacity constitutes a cap on the quantity of broad money 
outstanding. Permit capacity is tradable among member banks . . . no member bank is permitted to hold more 
than some specified percentage of outstanding permit capacity, say 10%. . .the monetary authority establishes 
the cap. It may adjust the cap in the conduct of monetary policy . . . Thus the size of the member banking 
system is determined by the conduct of monetary policy.” 
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establish the cap and be responsible for adjusting it periodically in the course 
of its monetary policy.  
Third—and the crux of Ricks’ proposal—a federal insurance program 
would be established to backstop all the short-term debt obligations of the 
licensed SIFIs. All the short-term debt obligations of “critically 
undercapitalized” member banks would be “seamlessly honored” by the 
federal government.114 This would have the effect, in Ricks’ view, of fully 
protecting money-claimants and eliminating destabilizing panics.115 
Fourth, to raise the funds for the insurance program, the member banks 
would be charged risk-based fees.116 These fees would be priced so that “each 
member bank [would] incur the financing cost it would incur if it financed 
itself entirely in the longer-term private capital markets.” To offset this 
increased cost on the banking system, the member banks would bear none of 
the cost of paying interest to their short-term creditors (“the government 
[would] bear all of it”).117  
Finally, in order to reign in moral hazard at the banks—a natural 
consequence of Ricks’ insurance program—“member banks [would be] subject 
to portfolio restrictions and capital requirements,”118 with “a supervisory 
regime in charge of monitoring compliance with the constraints.”  
C. Critiquing the Ricks Approach  
I agree with the underlying ethos of the Ricks plan—of deposit insurance 
being the right panic-proofing fix. Remember that the advent of deposit 
insurance in 1934 led to the 75-year “Quiet Period” in American banking—but 
that, overtime, as institutional “depositors” superseded retail depositors as Wall 
Street’s principal source of funds, FDIC insurance became an anachronistic 
solution to forestalling panics. Modernizing deposit insurance to account for 
the institutional depositor—that is, to fend off the modern-day panic—seems a 
logical course for financial policy to take.  
 
 114 Id., at 227.  
 115 Id., at 202.  
 116 Id., at 226.  
 117 Id., at 203. “Accordingly, the determination of how much (if any) interest is to be paid on such 
balances is a policy question, to be determined by the monetary authority. It is not a matter to be left to banks 
and their account holders.”  
 118 Id., at 225–26.  
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However, is the Ricks plan asking too much? The support of Congress—
and let’s face it, the Banking Lobby—is a prerequisite to dramatically 
overhauling the banking system. Ricks describes his plan as “conservative” but 
also “radical”; in the end, it might just be politically impracticable.  
The Ricks plan would be likely to face political backlash on the following 
four points: (1) precluding the major nonbanks from accessing the short-term 
debt markets, (2) capping the short-term debt exposure of the licensed 
commercial banks, (3) federally insuring all the short-term debt obligations of 
the member banks, and (4) imposing major risk-based fees.  
Most contentious would be the third point. Cost-conscious and bailout-
averse policymakers would be unable to stomach the sheer scope of Ricks’ 
proposed insurance regime, which would guarantee all the short-term debt 
obligations of the member banks (i.e., both secured and unsecured debt of one-
year-or-less maturity). It is not clear whether the risk-based fees would be able 
to generate enough revenue to honor a potentially gargantuan amount of 
insurance claims.  
D. A New Idea: Federal Government as a Secured Repo Backstop  
Given the realpolitik issues of the Ricks plan and the questionable 
collateral-quality assumption driving the Gorton plan, I will offer a different 
panic-proofing approach. My plan involves two key ideas: (1) providing 
federal deposit insurance for the very-short-maturity repo obligations of the 
SIFIs (while also ensuring the high quality of the collateral under those repo 
agreements) and (2) limiting the access of the SIFIs to all other forms of 
uninsured short-term debt.  
1. Federal Government as Fully Secured Runnable Repo Backstop  
The crux of my panic-proofing proposal is to establish a federal guarantee 
program to backstop the SIFIs’ runnable repo obligations. There are three main 
reasons why I believe this approach makes sense.  
First, an en masse “run on repo” was arguably the leading driver of the 
Great Recession, and it is therefore incumbent on policymakers to craft policy 
that directly addresses the runnable repo problem.  
Second, if we wish to make the repo market much less vulnerable to a run, 
then it is critical that we provide repo lenders with a safe demand-deposit-like 
account at Wall Street banks. Instant recourse to repo collateral (even high-
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quality collateral) is not enough of a security interest to forestall destabilizing 
repo runs. Only by guaranteeing the moneyness of repo deposits can we 
assuredly incentivize anxious repo lenders to roll over their repos.  
Third, that repo is a form of fully secured lending makes repo insurance a 
relatively safe governmental (and taxpayer) endeavor. Here’s how this system 
would work: the federal government (perhaps the FDIC or Federal Reserve) 
would be party to each repo agreement. In the event of a repo borrower default, 
the government would simply step into the shoes of the defaulting SIFI and 
repurchase the collateral from the repo lender at the agreed-upon price. The 
government would then take title to the collateral.  
There would be no naked bailouts. Nor would there be any need (as in the 
Ricks plan) to charge risk-based fees on the banking system to support a 
mammoth insurance regime. This is a crucial point: the federal government 
would only ever make insurance payouts to repo creditors in exchange for the 
high-quality collateral under each repo agreement.  
This is where Gorton’s idea about collateral quality fits nicely into this 
system. The federal government would be tasked with overseeing the quality 
of the collateral under each insured repo agreement. By ensuring that repo 
agreements contain only high-quality collateral, the government can reduce the 
chance of repo panics in the first place (as is Gorton’s key panic-proofing 
argument) while also augmenting the security of the repo backstop program.  
Moral hazard at the SIFIs becomes an issue. If the federal government 
agrees to backstop all of this runnable repo debt, won’t the SIFIs drive more 
recklessly behind the wheel? This is where the risk-constraint approach of 
Dodd-Frank and Basel III come back into focus. Implementing a federal 
backstop for the SIFIs’ runnable repo obligations does not mean abandoning 
federal oversight of the SIFIs’ balance sheets. Rather, the panic-proofing and 
risk-constraint approaches can—and should—work in tandem.  
2. Limiting the SIFIs’ Exposure to Runnable Short-Term Debt  
The second step in my plan is to limit the exposure of SIFIs to runnable 
short-term debt. For purposes of this system, runnable short-term debt can be 
divided into two categories: (1) insured repo debt and (2) all other forms of 
runnable debt (i.e., uninsured short-term debt).  
With respect to insured repo debt, I would adopt Gorton’s idea: 
commercial banks (with access to the Fed’s discount window) would not be 
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limited in terms of how much repo debt they could take out. All the other SIFIs 
would be limited in their repo debt exposure. The overseeing federal authority 
would have to determine the appropriate repo-exposure levels for these 
nonbank SIFIs.  
More importantly, on uninsured runnable debt, all of the SIFIs would be 
limited in their exposure, permitted to rely on only so much uninsured short-
term debt such that a run on that debt could only have a benign effect (i.e., not 
be destabilizing to their balance sheets). Again, the overseeing regulatory 
authority would be tasked with determining the appropriate exposure levels of 
the SIFIs to this type of uninsured short-term debt.  
In sum, this system envisions the SIFIs financing themselves with a 
mixture of long-and-medium term debt, insured short-term repo debt, and only 
an unthreatening amount of uninsured short-term debt.  
CONCLUSION 
I have tried in this paper to build upon the “panic-proofing” approach to 
financial regulation, as championed by Yale economist Gary Gorton and 
Vanderbilt law professor Morgan Ricks. Panics are the financial problem of 
our time. If policymakers fail to adopt a panic-proofing attitude to financial 
regulation, a repeat of 2008 seems to be not a matter of “if” but “when.” 
I have proposed in this paper an original panic-proofing solution that is 
focused primarily on the short-term repo debt market. I envision the federal 
government becoming a fully secured repo backstop, guaranteeing to very-
short-term repo creditors the moneyness of their deposits at the SIFIs while 
also limiting the SIFIs in their exposure to other forms of runnable short-term 
debt. The government would be fully and safely secured by the high-quality 
collateral under each insured repo agreement.  
Creating another Quiet Period should be the goal of financial regulation. 
History begs of us to respond to the runnable short-term debt problem. These 
institutions are too big—too important—to fail. Panic-proofing—one way or 
another—can recreate the quiet.  
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